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Abstract
This paper is about using speci…c investments and secured debt to shield a
…rm from exploitation by a regulatory authority. It is shown that speci…c
investments and secured debt constrain the regulatory authority in its choice
of regime, by providing a credible threat of bankruptcy.
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1 Regulatory constraints
It is a common presumption in the literature on regulation that the Regu-
lator or regulatory agency has limited powers. Looking at the world around
us, this assumption appears to be justi…ed. If the Regulator really was om-
niscient, her preferred outcome would always obtain. In reality outcomes of
the regulatory process often are highly imperfect, even taking into account
the sometimes di¤use objectives of regulatory agencies. In fact, even in
cases where the Regulator’s mandate is quite clear, examples of ine¤ective
regulation abound.1
Limits to regulation have been modelled in a number of ways in the
theoretical literature. In the older literature on regulation, bounds on regu-
latory discretion were often imposed exogeneously. A common form of this
was restrictions to linear schemes such as uniform per–unit taxes. Linear
schemes or piecewise linear schemes with only a few kinks are appealing
due to their simplicity. Furthermore, these types of schemes are frequently
observed in the real world. In situations with perfect information there is
often no loss involved in using linear schemes. However, allowing some form
of non-linearity, eg. not imposing the restriction of linearity, should theo-
retically improve matters for the Regulator. How big a loss is incurred by
employing a linear form obviously depends on the setting.2
Another problem for the regulatory authority, on which a large litera-
ture has emerged, is asymmetric information. Here the limits to regulatory
powers lie in the information available to the Regulator. If the regulated
parties possess considerably more information about themselves than does
the Regulator, very likely they are able to use this to their advantage. One
of the earliest contributions to this literature is Baron and Myerson (1982).
A large number of later works (in particular by Jean Jacques La¤ont and
Jean Tirole) are synthesized in La¤ont and Tirole (1993).
Holmström and Milgrom (1987), Gjesdal (1988), and La¤ont and Tirole
(1993) all identify cases in which simple linear or “one–kinked” piecewise
linear functions are no less e¢cient than fully general schemes under asym-
metric information. They also discuss the feasibility of approximating the
fully optimal scheme with piecewise linear functions. Jebjerg and Lando
(1997) extend the analysis of La¤ont and Tirole to include settings typi-
cal for environmental problems, and take a slightly more negative view on
linearity.
The incomplete contracting framework of Grossman and Hart (1986),
1Just open a newspaper for examples. The point is illustrated by the fact that a number
of countries have nationalized (and, for di¤erent reasons, privatized) key industries at one
time or another, implying that “ownership” is associated with more extensive controlrights
than “regulation”.
2 It also depends on the number of kinks allowed in the piecewise linear functional form.
Any continous function can be approximated closely by some piecewise linear function.
1
Hart and Moore (1988), and others also has some relevance for this paper.
These authors explain imperfections by assuming that certain key actions,
while observable, are not contractible in the sense of not being veri…able to
a court, or any other third party. The noncontractability creates a role for
a holder of residual rights of control, much like in the present paper.
Finally, an explaination that is very di¤erent from the one presented here
is given by political theories, including the political economy literature. This
approach focuses on the Firm’s stakeholders and their ability to in‡uence
the regulatory process through in‡uence activities. A prime example is
Grossman and Helpman (1994).
In this paper we o¤er an alternative explanation of regulatory imperfec-
tions, in the spirit of the incomplete contracting models, by showing that
the Firm’s …nancial structure matters. Speci…cally, sunk investments and
debt can be a restraining device vis â vis the Regulator, assuming the Reg-
ulator has a preference for the Firm staying in business. This preference
may exist if the Firm generates bene…ts, such as jobs or tax revenue, that
would be lost were the Firm to shut down. Presumably, the Regulator also
wants to impose a regulatory regime (taxation, environmental regulation,
etc.) on the Firm. The Regulator’s preferences may lead to the following
time–inconsistency problem: When …rst approached by the Firm, the Reg-
ulator may well promise to run a lenient regulatory regime, possibly even
to give current and future subsidies, in exchange for the Firm setting up an
operation in the Regulator’s domain. Once the Firm’s sunk investments are
in place, however, it is locked into a relationship with the Regulator. Now,
given its typical powers of enforcement, the Regulator is able to renege on
his promises, and even extract concessions from the Firm. He can do so up
to the point where regulation is so burdensome, it becomes pro…table for the
Firm to write o¤ its investment and discontinue operations. Of course, a
clever Firm would try to …nd ways to protect itself, or abstain from investing
altogether.
What I show in this paper, is that the possibilities for hold-up by the
regulatory authority can be partially o¤set by the Firm’s capital (ownership)
structure. The Firm can counter the Regulator’s threat of exploitation by
taking on secured debt, which embeds a promise to hand the Firm’s assets
over to its Creditors if the Firm cannot service its debt obligations. Thus,
the possibility of regulatory hold–up leads the Firm to favour debt when
…nancing a project. By highlighting an example of non–neutrality of …rms’
performance to …nancial structure, this paper can be seen as part of the large
literature challenging the assumptions of the Modligiani–Miller theorem.
The main assumption is that …rms are not necessarily fully compensated
for costs imposed by regulation. This view is supported by many authors.
To quote from a book on law and economics by Thomas Miceli, “In con-
trast to physical acquisitions or intrusions, government regulation of private
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property generally does not require compensation. Instead it is viewed as a
legitimate exercise of the government’s police power.” (Miceli 1997, p. 137)
Miceli then goes on to argue that even in cases where government regula-
tion is so burdensome so as to be considered a “regulatory taking” for which
compensation is due, the regulated parties are generally undercompensated.
A court case referred by Miceli (p. 146) shows that taking on debt may
actually have a favourable e¤ect on the outcome of the legal process. In-
vestment backed expectations is quoted as one of three key factors in the
1978 U.S. Supreme Court ruling Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of
New York. The ruling establishes that “In particular, compensation is more
likely, all else equal, if regulation interferes with development plans that are
investment-backed”. So the regulated parties may get a more favourable
treatment if regulation interferes with plans involving third–party investors.
A second case where …rms’ investments in place clearly matter for the
regulatory treatment is the stranded assets problem common to privatized
utilities. The term “stranded assets” refers to sunk investments made before
politically imposed structural changes, such as liberalization of the market.
These investments may be huge for …rms such as utilities. The changing
nature of contracts, and supplier–/customer relationships following liber-
alization, often mean that a substantial part of the …rm’s assets in place
become inappropriate in the new environment (“stranded” in the jargon).
Providing some form of compensation to owners of stranded assets, per-
haps through a more lenient regulatory treatment (pass through of costs
to consumers), is an essential feature of the regulation of newly liberalized
industries.
In this paper we show that debt, by creating a credible threat of bankrupcy,
can e¤ectively limit the Regulator’s freedom to exploit the regulated Firm.
2 The model
The structure of the model is shown in …gure 1. A single project with an
initial capital requirement of one unit is considered. During the lifetime of
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the project a number of decisions need to be taken by the Entrepreneur.
These will in‡uence his …nal payo¤. However, the Regulator also cares
about these decisions and will try to in‡uence the Entrepreneur. Ultimately,
payo¤s from the project are realized and the project is liquidated.
The project can be …nanced by the Entrepreneur’s own money I0 and/or
a loan D0, as long as I0 and D0 are non–negative and sum to one. Any debt
taken on initially must be repaid when the project has been completed.
The choice of …nancial structure is the focus of this paper. To make mat-
ters interesting, we need at least three agents. The Entrepreneur implements
and owns the project.3 The Regulator wants to in‡uence the Entrepreneur’s
actual implementation of the project and has the authority to do so. An
example is the case of an Entrepreneur setting up a small plant. Once the
plant has been set–up, the local authority has a stake in inducing the En-
trepreneur to take on more labour, buy inputs locally, etc., even though
these may not be good business decisions from the Entrepreneur’s point of
view. Realizing these opportunities for hold–up exists, the Entrepreneur will
seek ways to protect himself. In this paper, I argue that taking on secured
debt prior to undertaking the project will, to some degree, shield the En-
trepreneur from being expropriated by the Regulator. In order to introduce
debt we need a third party; the …rm’s Creditors.
The timing is as follows: First the Entrepreneur decides whether or not
to undertake the project. If he decides to go ahead with the project, he
must invest one unit of capital. He can choose to invest any combination
of own or borrowed funds as long as it sums to one (I0 + D0 = 1). The
Regulator then makes a binding announcement of the regulatory regime, R.4
Given this announcement the Entrepreneur decides whether to Continue
or Stop the project. If the project is continued, it generates a bene…cial
externality, valued at S0 > 0 by the Regulator,5 and the Entrepreneur must
abide by the regulatory regime (implement R). Before pro…ts are paid out,
the Entrepreneur must repay any debt with interest. Denote the principal
D0 2 [0; 1], and the value of debt with interest ¿D0.6 A repayment of
D < ¿D0 means that the Entrepreneur defaults on his obligations. In case
of default the Creditors get to decide whether to liquidate the project or
not. Under the assumption that the Creditors never opt to renegotiate the
…rm’s debt, they will always liquidate and get the …rm’s assets (up to the
value of outstanding debt).7 The Entrepreneur’s liability is limited to the
3Ownership in this context is identi…ed with residual controlrights.
4R could be an index of net taxes levied on the …rm.
5The externality could be in the form of tax–revenue, employment etc. The bene…ts
are only needed to ensure that R+S0 is strictly positive and amounts to a normalization
of R.
6All amounts can be thought of as denominated in date one currency.
7The assumption of no renegotiation can be given a number of justi…cations. One is
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liquidation value of the project’s assets A or the value of outstanding debt
¿D0 ¡ D, whichever is less.
More formally, the Entrepreneur manages the project and cares about
net pro…ts. The pro…t is in‡uenced by the Regulatory regime as well as the
period 1 …nancing decision. Let R 2 [0; 1] be an index of the stringency of
the regulatory regime (interpreting R = 0 as “very loose”, R = 1 as “very
stringent”). If the project is undertaken the Entrepreneur must adhere to
the regulatory regime, ie. implement R. Let A > 0 be the ex-post value of
the project’s assets8 and B(R) be net project revenue as a function of the
costs induced by regulation. Finally, let D be the amount of debt actually
repaid, and º be the opportunity cost of own funds. Net pro…ts if the project
is not liquidated is:
¦ ´ B(R) + A ¡ D ¡ ºI0 (1)
The last term is non–zero only if the project is not fully debt–…nanced.
Note that as the initial investment I0 is sunk in period 1, the last term only
matters for the initial investment decision.
If the Entrepreneur repays only D < ¿D0 (ie. defaults) and the Creditors
subsequently exercise their option to liquidate the project, the Creditors get
a payo¤ of:
min(A; ¿D0 ¡ D) (2)
The Entrepreneur’s net pro…t in liquidation, using (1) and (2) and the fact
that B(R) is not paid out when the project is liquidated, is:
¦L ´ max(¡D;A ¡ ¿D0) ¡ ºI0 (3)
It is easily seen that given the project will be liquidated it is optimal to
repay nothing, ie. set D = 0.
The Regulator cares about the amount of surplus she is able to squeeze
out of the …rm, measured by R. The Regulator cannot set R directly but can
specify a regulatory regime R 2 [0; 1] by which the Entrepreneur must abide
if the project is to be undertaken. Also, the Regulator gains some exogeneous
bene…t S0 > 0 from the realization of the project. Think of S0 as a positive
externality (jobs, taxes, etc.) generated by the project and R 2 [0; 1] as the
that this particular project is small relative to the creditors’ other engagements. Then
not renegotiating entails only a small loss, relative to the the gain from “playing tough”
and deterring other debtors from defaulting strategically.
The main results will go through with su¢ciently high cost of bankruptcy, even when
renegotiation is allowed. See the appendix for more details.
8The value of the assets should be thought of as contingent on the ex–ante expected
regulatory regime (which may very well matter for the investment decision). It is plausible
that the actual regulatory regime does not a¤ect asset values, as the Regulator always has
the option of changing the rules. This will of course not hold true if the next regime is
thought to be very much like the current.
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“intensity” of regulation. For simplicity S0 is assumed to be independent of
R. The important assumption is that the Regulator’s and the Entrepreneur’s
objectives are not perfectly corrolated, hence more “regulation” lowers the
…rm’s pro…ts. Also it is important that the Regulator gains something from
not to shutting the …rm down. The Regulator’s objective function is
W = S0 + R (4)
If debt repayments are not made, Creditors gain the right to force the
project into bankruptcy. As the present value of debt with interest is ¿D0, a
repayment of D < ¿D0 means the Entrepreneur defaults on his obligations.
In case of default Creditors have the option to seize control of the project’s
assets, valued at A. Below we will assume depreciation/asset speci…city,
0 < A < ¿ . The asset could be machines, buildings, and/or human capital,
necessary for production but not possible to install and remove at zero cost.
Creditors are assumed to operate on a competitive market, thus they have
no ex–ante bargaining power vis â vis the Entrepreneur.
A number of assumptions are needed to more formally capture the struc-
ture presented above:
Assumption I (Regulatory Powers): The Regulator has the power to
announce any regulatory regime R 2 [0; 1] when the capital structure
of the project has been choosen. She cannot commit herself to any
further actions, including the payment of monetary transfers.
The regulatory authority is thus endowed with coercive powers vis â
vis the regulated parties. As argued in the introduction this is often the
case in North American common law (and most other countries’ law as
well). The lack of commitment is a serious constraint on compensatory
transfers (these are essentially ruled out). Note that if the Regulator could
credibly commit to the regulatory regime before the Entrepreneur makes his
investment decision, there would be no role in the model for debt …nancing
under Assumption IV (a,d) below.
Assumption II (Outside options): The Entrepreneur and the Regu-
lator get payo¤s ¦ = W = 0 if the project is not undertaken or the
asset is removed from the Entrepreneur (by forced liquidation).
Assumption III (Asset speci…city): If an investment of one unit is
undertaken in period 1, the Entrepreneur obtains a productive asset
A with a post–period 1 value of: 0 < A < º.9
9Recall º ¸ 1 is the opportunity cost of investing own funds (which is less than the
cost of borrowing, see Assumption IV).
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Thus, the asset is not a good passive investment object; buying it with-
out using it yields less than putting money in the bank. The realization of
the project generates a positive externality S0, captured by the Regulator.
A possibility is A + S0 = º which gives a nice interpretation of the invest-
ment. Also note that, even though the Regulator in some cases would like
to promise to compensate the Entrepreneur for investing, this is not credible
under assumption I.
Assumption IV (Financing and Debt):
(a) Debt …nancing is (weakly) more expensive than investing own savings:
¿ ¸ º ¸ 1.
(b) Debt repayments cannot be negative, D ¸ 0.
(c) Limited liability: In case of default (D < ¿D0), creditors can seize at
most min(A; ¿D0 ¡ D)
(d) The Entrepreneur is not wealth–constrained, I0 ¸ 1.
Part (a) assures that debt …nancing would not be an optimal strategy if
the Regulator could commit before the initial investment decision is made
not to expropriate the Entrepreneur’s surplus. If capital markets are perfect,
¿ = º. Assumptions III and IV implies A < ¿ . Part (c) says that Creditors
are not entitled to more than the value of outstanding debt ¿D0 ¡ D or the
…rm’s assets A, whichever is worth less. Regarding part (d) we need the
assumption I0 > 0 (the Entrepreneur has some personal wealth) to make
matters non–trivial. Having I0 ¸ 1 simpli…es the analysis.
Finally, to make matters interesting we need an assumption stating that
the consequenses of regulation are su¢ciently important to the project. This
is an assumption on the range of the function B : [0; 1] ! R (measuring
attainable pro…ts as a function of the regulatory environment). By varying
this, we would in e¤ect be able to incorporate costly e¤ort in the model.
Assumption V (Regulation Matters): The function B(¢) is strictly
decreasing and continuous. Furthermore,
(a) 9 ¹R 2]0; 1[: B( ¹R) = ¿ ¡ A.
(b) B(1) = 0.
Part (a) says that a fully debt …nanced project breaks even for some
intermediate value of R. This implies that under a “no regulation” regime
(R = 0), the project is pro…table regardless of …nancing method. It also
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implies B(1) < ¿ ¡A, ie. a fully debt …nanced project is not pro…table with
intensive regulation. Part (b) is stronger than needed and implies: B(1) <
º¡A. Hence ¦ = B(1)+A¡¿D0¡ºI0 < 0 for any combination (I0; D0) 2 ¢,
where ¢ ´ f(x; y) ¸ 0jx + y = 1g. That is, a very demanding regulatory
regime always makes the project unpro…table, no matter what method of
…nancing is choosen. If the Regulator could (in violation of Assumption I)
commit to compensate the Entrepreneur for any regulatory costs incurred,
B (¢) would be a “‡at” schedule and regulation would not matter in the
model.
3 Debt as a shield
The basic trade-o¤ when the initial investment has been sunk is as follows:
The Entrepreneur will optimally default on his obligations by repaying noth-
ing if net revenue, excluding the initial sunk investment, ¼ ´ ¦ + ºI0 =
B(R) + A ¡ ¿D0, is negative. By doing this he loses the asset A, pro…ts ¦,
and the ex-post value ºI0 of his investment. On the other hand, he limits
his liability to the minimum of (A; ¿D0).
The model is solved by backwards induction (cf. …gure 1).
Stage 4: If the Entrepreneur defaults on his obligations (D < ¿D0), the
Creditors (…gure 2) have the right to force the project into bankruptcy and
seize control of the asset A. It is apparent that the Creditors will always
choose to liquidate the project as A > 0.10
Stage 3: The Entrepreneur (…gure 3) has the choice of stopping or
continuing the project. If the project is …nanced by his own money, he will
always continue (even under the strictest regulatory regime, R = 1, stopping
is no worse than continuing by assumption V (b)).
For a debt …nanced project, continuing is equivalent to repaying the debt
in full (D = ¿D0). Stopping means paying nothing at all (D = 0).11 If the
Entrepreneur opts to continue, the project yields pro…t ¦cont = B(R) +
A ¡ ¿D0 ¡ ºI0. If the project is stopped (by the Entrepreneur repaying
nothing and the Creditors subsequently liquidating the project) the pro…t is
¦stop = max(0; A ¡ ¿D0) ¡ ºI0  0 for (I0;D0) 2 ¢ under assumptions III
and IV. Continuation and repayment is optimal i¤
¼ =
½
B(R) ¸ 0 for D0  A=¿
B(R) + A ¡ ¿D0 ¸ 0 for D0 > A=¿ (5)
10Under the maintained assumption of no renegotiation in bankruptcy.
11 It is easily seen that any other level of debt repayment is suboptimal given the credi-
tors’ behaviour: For D0 > 0, choosing 0 < D < ¿D0 resp. D > ¿D0 is more costly than
D = 0 respectively D = ¿D0 and doesn’t change the outcome.
For low levels of debt (D0  A=¿) it is optimal to repay the Creditors and stop the
project (selling o¤ the asset), if B(R) < 0. This is ruled out by assumption V.
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Call this the continuation constraint. It is always ful…lled for low levels
of debt (D0  A=¿), but may not be ful…lled for high levels of debt. The
intuition is that, under limited liability with a high level of debt, it is some-
times better for the Entrepreneur to give up on his sunk investment than to
implement the current regulatory regime and repay the Creditors.
Stage 2: The Regulator can induce the Entrepreneur to Continue or
Stop the project by the choice of R (see …gure 4). As W cont = S0 + R >
0 = W stop for all R, the Regulator prefers to induce “Continue”. Hence, she
must solve:
R¤ = arg max
R2[0;1]
R st. ¼ ¸ 0
This yields R¤ = B¡1(¿D0 ¡ A) st. R¤ 2 [0; 1]. Parameterizing R¤ by
D0, we get our …rst result:
Lemma 1 The optimal regulatory regime is given by:
R¤ =
8<:
R for D0 = 1
B¡1(¿D0 ¡ A) for D0 2 [A¿ ; 1[
1 for D0 2 [0; A¿ [
(6)
It is optimal to regulate a …rm with debt more lenient than a …rm with
no debt so as not to force it into liquidation. We are able to conclude that
the Regulator optimally sets a more lenient regime for a Firm with a high
level of debt. This is formalized in lemma 2:
Lemma 2 The optimal regulatory regime is weakly decreasing in D0. For
any level of debt D0 2
£
A
¿ ; 1
£
, the optimal regulatory regime R is monotoni-
cally decreasing in D0.
Proof: For D0 2
£
A
¿ ; 1
£
, the optimality condition (6) has an interior
solution by assumption V. Again by assumption V, this solution is mono-
tonically decreasing in the argument of B¡1(¢). The …rst statement follows
directly from inspection of condition (6) ¤
Stage 1: The Entrepreneur decides whether or not to undertake the
project. If he is to invest, he must be able to ensure for himself at least his
outside option value of zero. His participation constraint is:
9(I0; D0) 2 ¢ : B(R¤) + A ¡ ºI0 ¡ ¿D0 ¸ 0
Where R¤ is given by (6). Under Assumption IV (a), satisfaction of the
continuation constraint (5) for D0 = 1 implies satisfaction of the participa-
tion constraint. It is easy to show that the participation constraint is never
satis…ed for D0 < 1:
9
u³³³³³³1PPPPPPq
Continue
Liquidate
D
D + min(A; ¿D0 ¡ D)
Figure 2: Creditors’ decision when D < ¿D0 (default).
u³³³³³³1PPPPPPq
D = ¿D0
D = 0
¼cont = B(R) + A ¡ ¿D0 ¡ ºI0
¼stop = max(0; A ¡ ¿D0) ¡ ºI0
Figure 3: The Entrepreneur’s decision.
Proposition 3 The Entrepreneur will never undertake the project if he
must invest his own funds. The project will be undertaken if the Entrepreneur
can borrow.
Proof: The condition for participation with 1 ¸ I0 ¸ 0; D0 = 1 ¡ I0 is
B(R¤) + A ¡ ºI0 ¡ ¿D0 ¸ B(R¤jD0=1) + A ¡ ¿ = 0 , B(R¤jD0=1) ¡ B(R¤) 
(1 ¡ D0)¿ ¡ ºI0 = (¿ ¡ º)I0. By substituting the optimal R¤ from (6), one
can verify that this is satis…ed for I0 = 0, but not for I0 > 0 ¤
Thus, we have established that the Entrepreneur will never risk his own
funds as they will always be expropriated by the Regulator. By inspecting
proposition 3, one may notice that the Entrepreneur is indi¤erent between
undertaking the project and not when it is debt–…nanced. Of course the
Regulator would be willing to leave a small amount of surplus to the En-
trepreneur to induce him to continue the project. A somewhat stronger
result can be obtained by introducing a non–appropriable bene…t of running
the project, which also breaks the indi¤erence.
One important question remains unresolved: Why is debt used at all?
We have seen that the Entrepreneur desires to take on debt even though
10
u³³³³³³1PPPPPPq
“Go”
“Stop”
Wcont = S0 + ~R
W stop = 0
Figure 4: The Regulator’s decision.
this may be a more expensive way of …nancing the project. What is less
clear at this stage is why the Regulator must allow the …rm to do so.
Suppose as before that the Entrepreneur can …nance the project with
his own money or debt. As the Entrepreneur have no credible leverage over
the Regulator once the project is underway, any sunk investment …nanced
with the Entrepreneur’s own money will be appropriated by the Regulator,
yielding I0 > 1 ) ¦ < 0 (by the analysis above). Realizing this, the project
will not be undertaken. If the Entrepreneur is allowed to take on debt, he
will optimally set D0 = 1, thus getting a payo¤ of ¦ = 0 and (just) be
willing to undertake the project.
As the Regulator gets W = S0 + R¤ > 0 when the project is undertaken
and W = 0 when it is not, it is not an equilibrium strategy for the Regulator
to preclude the Entrepreneur from taking on debt.
In equilibrium Creditors get ¿D0. The yield on their investment is
¿D0=D0 = ¿ ¸ 1, which is the market rate if the market for credit is
competitive.
4 Discussion
We have seen that debt can act as a device to constrain the discretion of
the Regulator. Actually this improves matters for the Regulator as well by
acting as a commitment device in the sense of Kydland and Prescott (1977).
The special feature of the debt instrument is that it relates transfers of
control to …nancial performance. In case of default, the Creditors gain the
right to assume control of the project’s assets. By providing a credible
mechanism for removing the assets from the Entrepreneur, and hence from
the in‡uence of the Regulator, when the project performs badly, the secured
debt contract e¤ectively provides a restraining- or commitment device for
the Regulator. It is a common result that the presence of such a device
can raise welfare. Observe that equity cannot perform this role, precisely
because it doesn’t provide a credible way of liquidating the project when
performance is bad. In this model equity–…nance works in exactly the same
way as the Entrepreneur’s investment I0.
Of course there are a number of other reasons for using debt in a …rm’s
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…nancial structure, most of which are not featured in this simple model.
Therefore the present model should not be interpreted as an explanation of
the optimal debt/equity mix, but rather as an example of a regulatory con-
straint. In this context it is important to note that even though the typical
real world debt/assets ratio is signi…cantly lower than 1 (the prediction of
this model), debt can still act as an e¤ective restraining mechanism.
The somewhat dramatic result that the project will never be undertaken
unless fully debt–…nanced is an artefact of the simple structure of the model.
The general result that debt o¤ers the Entrepreneur some protection will
carry through under more plausible assumptions. The important features
are that the Entrepreneur will choose to scale back the project when regu-
lated heavily, and that the Regulator dislikes this su¢ciently much.
It is possible to empirically validate or falsify the conclusions of this pa-
per. A test could run along the lines of whether capital–intensive industries
(such as utilities, airlines, etc.), where …rms in general have large external
debts, are subject to more burdersome regulation than less capital intensive
industries (services, say). Casual observation seem to con…rm this a pri-
ori. It is important to do such a test by comparing di¤erent industries. A
…rm–to–…rm intra–industry comparision will not in general be satisfactory,
as regulation is typical done on an industrywide basis. To do a proper test,
one must be able to control for features, such as market structure, that make
some industries more likely targets for regulation than others.
An application of the model, somewhat di¤erent from the set–up in this
paper, is to procurement. A buyer entering into a long–term project (eg.
the construction of a bridge or a tunnel) with a seller may want the seller
to take on debt. This, coupled with an appropriately structured payments
contract, commits the seller to keep making progress on the project in order
to get funds from the buyer to repay the Creditors. If he doesn’t, the seller
runs the danger of loosing control of the project’s assets. Of course, as recent
experience shows, one would have to be very careful about the possibilities
of renegotiation in such a case.
A Appendix: Default and renegotiation
The purpose of this appendix is to evaluate the e¤ects of introducing rene-
gotiation in the model. Allowing for renegotiation adds the possibility of
strategic default on the part of the Entrepreneur. Strategic default is a sit-
uation where the Entrepreneur could in fact repay his debt, but chooses not
to, in order to obtain a more favourable outcome through the renegotiation
process.
Assume that the Entrepreneur has borrowed one unit of capital (D0 = 1)
and that there is a …xed cost K > 0 of renegotiation. If the Entrepreneur
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chooses to default rather than repay his debt, he might as well repay nothing
(D = 0) as was shown in the main text.
If the Entrepreneur defaults (D = 0), the Creditors face the choice of
stopping the project, or renegotiating the terms of the contract. The aim
of renegotiation is to hand control of the asset back to the Entrepreneur
who can use it most productively (obtain a surplus that is larger that the
liquidation value A of the asset). Liquidating the project yields a payo¤ of
A. Renegotiating with Nash–bargaining gives
A + (1 ¡ ®) [B(R¤) ¡ K]
where (1¡®) 2]0; 1[ is the relative bargaining power of the Creditors, B(R¤)
is the value of the asset when it is controlled by the Entrepreneur under the
current regulatory regime, K > 0 is the …xed cost of renegotiating the
contract. The Creditors will choose to renegotiate rather than to liquidate
i¤
A + (1 ¡ ®) [B(R¤) ¡ K] ¸ A () B(R¤) ¸ K (7)
The Entrepreneur will choose to default rather than repay the full amount
owed (¿) i¤
® [B(R¤) ¡ K] > B(R¤) + A ¡ ¿ () (1 ¡ ®)B(R¤) + A + ®K < ¿ (8)
where ® is the Entrepreneur’s relative bargaining power. That is, the
Entrepreneur will renegotiate if the loss from defaulting and renegotiating
– a fraction of the output ((1 ¡ ®)B(R¤)), plus the liquidation value of the
asset (A), and a share of the cost of renegotiating (®K) is less than the
savings (¿) from not repaying the initial debt.
The Regulator maximizes R in one of two possible cases, each with a
di¤erent set of constraints.
Case I — The Entrepreneur chooses to repay rather than to liquidate,
and has to break even: B(R)+A¡¿ ¸ 0. This case prevails when bankruptcy
costs are high (K ¸ ¿ ¡ A). The solution is exactly as in the main text
(lemma 1).
Case II — the Entrepreneur defaults but the Creditors choose to rene-
gotiate. This case prevails when (K < ¿ ¡ A). The set of constraints are:
(1 ¡ ®)B(R¤) + A + ®K < ¿ and B(R¤) ¡ K ¸ 0. The optimal strategy
for the Regulator is to choose R¤ such that B(R¤) = K , R¤ > R.12 In
this case, the project will not be undertaken because the Creditors cannot
guarantee themselves an adequate return on their investment of D0 = 1.
In equilibrium they get a repayment of only A + (1 ¡ ®) [B(R¤) ¡ K] = A
(substitute B(R¤) = K), which is less than the market rate ¿ . This holds
12Choose R = 1 > R, if K > 1.
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regardless of their bargaining power (1 ¡ ®). Hence they are not willing to
…nance the project.
The facts about renegotiation that emerge from this analysis are: For
su¢ciently high bankruptcy costs (K ¸ A ¡ ¿), the solution is exactly the
same as with no renegotiation. For smaller bankruptcy costs, the market
breaks down and the project will not be undertaken. In the latter case, the
Regulator exploits his “…rst mover advantage” (100% bargaining power in
the jargon of contract theory) to capture all the ex–post gains from rene-
gotiation. Renegotiation costs should be at least as high as the combined
investment costs — the cost of borrowing funds, and depreciation of assets,
for the conclusions of the model to be valid.
It is straightforward to verify that the renegotiation game is robust to
asymmetric costs of renegotiation, with KC ¸ KE . A reason for the asym-
metry of costs could be that Creditors lose more than the direct costs of
bargaining if they come to be known as “weak” players that allow debtors
to renegotiate their commitments.
Whether bankruptcy costs in fact are high or low is an unsettled question.
Giammarino (1989) argues in a theoretical framework that it is rational for
players on the credit market to incur signi…cant bankruptcy costs in the
presence of asymmetric information, even when the possibility of costless
renegotiation exists. Of course, asymmetry of information is not an issue in
the present model. On the other hand, Warner (1977) in a much cited study
estimates US bankruptcy costs to be less than 1% of …rms’ pre–bankruptcy
valuations.
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